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Relational rent and underperformance of hub firms in the 
aeronautics value chain 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The present paper shows that in response to deep-seated changes in the aeronautics sector, 
tier-one hub firms now feature in the supply chain in the role of architect-integrators for key 
components. According to the Relational-Based approach, this pivotal position should enable 
them to achieve supernormal performance. Our statistical analysis, performed between the 
years 2000 and 2007 with sub-contracting firms in the aeronautics sector in the Aquitaine and 
Midi-Pyrenees regions, allowed us to identify the impact of this status on their main 
organisational features. Our conclusions suggest that, on the contrary, hub firms are under-
performing. Our econometric analysis confirms the argument that hub firms are experiencing 
a financial performance which is both less robust and less persistent than the other firms in 
our sample population. In order to explain these findings which contradict the hypothesis of 
the development of a relational rent in the aeronautics industry, we investigated the most 
recent contingent factors. The architect-integrators’ ability to harness this relational rent, the 
duration of the investment cycle and family-based capitalism all help to explain the under-
performance of hub firms attached to this industry. 
 
 
Key words: relational rent, value chain, hub firms, financial performance, aeronautics. 
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Introduction 
In the field of strategic management and from a relational-based perspective, additional profit 
generated through partnerships underpinned by exchange (Mentzer, Foggin & Golicic, 2000; 
Gunasekaran, Patelb & McGaughey, 2004; Sheu, Yen & Chae, 2006; Cao & Zhang, 2011; 
Wagner, Grosse-Ruyken & Erhun, 2012) is sometimes referred to as relational rent (Dyer, 
1996; Dyer & Singh,1998; Beamon, 1998; Tan, et al., 1999; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000; 
Krause, Scannel & Calantone, 2000; Shin, Collier & Wilson 2000; Giannoccaro & 
Pontrandolfo, 2004; Xu & Beamon, 2006). The relational approach follows the competitive-
positioning approach or the so-called Harvard school of thought (Porter, 1980), which 
suggests that the industry to which the enterprise belongs is the main factor in determining its 
performance in that it presents favourable (or unfavourable) attributes to develop a 
competitive edge. It also builds on the resource and knowledge-based approach (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991) according to which performance is the product 
of the companies’ ability to coherently assemble strategic resources and competencies. 
The formation of relational rent has previously been identified in the automotive industry 
between manufacturers and tier 1 component suppliers (Dyer, 1996; Kotabe, Martin & 
Domoto, 2003; Jayaram, Vickery & Droge, 2008; Corsten, Gruen & Peyinghaus, 2011). In 
this paper, we examine relational rent in the aeronautics industry between aircraft 
manufacturers and strategic tier-one suppliers. The two industries differ on certain points, 
such as the number of players, the degree of globalisation, the duration of R&D investment 
and manufacturing cycles, etc. However, in both instances, strategic suppliers have emerged 
that are able to create an exchange-based relationship with their main clients, resulting in 
financial outperformance.  
To test the hypothesis that this type of rent exists in the aeronautics industry, we compared the 
financial performance of largely tier 1 hub firms, responsible for major aircraft components, 
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with other firms in the supply chain. The comparison was based on descriptive statistical 
analysis. We empirically selected a sample of firms featured in the INSEE [French National 
Institute of Statistical and Economic Information] annual survey on aeronautics outsourcing, 
using the Diane database to obtain the relevant financial data. To further support the validity 
of our findings, an econometric analysis was also performed; each time, our results 
contradicted the notion of relational rents in the aeronautics industry.  
Our paper is divided into four sections: first, we describe how the supply chain has developed 
in the field of aeronautics over the last two decades, and the key, strategically positioned 
players responsible for major components in the value chain, whose position should enable 
them to secure additional profit due to their privileged exchange relations. We then define our 
sample of hub firms and conduct a statistical analysis of their financial performance, which 
appears less than robust than the rest of the sample. Thirdly, we present an econometric 
analysis which confirms the profitability gap and indicates that architect-integrators capture a 
share of the profits (above all, Airbus). Finally, we discuss our findings, namely, the key 
positioning which, according to the relational-based approach, should lead to an 
outperformance and yet, when subjected to a set of contingent factors, appears to lead, at least 
temporarily, to a situation of underperformance. 
 
Conditions for the development of relational rent in the aeronautics value 
chain 
Sector-specific changes with respect to technology and production have led aircraft 
manufacturers to introduce refocusing and outsourcing strategies geared towards strategic 
suppliers. The former are referred to as architect-integrators, while the latter are hub firms for 
major components. 
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From aircraft manufacturers to architect-integrators  
Our interviews1 highlighted the huge technological changes currently affecting the aircraft 
industry, with aircraft becoming far more complex than ever before. The quantitative and 
qualitative importance of the aircraft’s aerostructural component (the airframe) has lost 
ground to embedded systems. The new generation of planes has accelerated the introduction 
of electro-hydraulic technologies, which have replaced centralised hydraulic systems, 
significantly reducing mass, as well as production and maintenance costs, with embedded 
systems that require evermore electrical power. Another technological milestone is the 
widespread use of composite and carbon fibre structural materials to replace aluminium and 
lithium.2 Overall, the knowledge and expertise required to design and build today’s aircraft 
has become increasingly complex. Aircraft manufacturers such as Airbus, Boeing, 
Bombardier or Embraer are consequently unable to oversee all the activities involved, and 
tend to focus on their core skills, adopting the role of architect. They continue to manufacture 
the most important structural elements (e.g., Airbus designs and manufactures the centre wing 
box, the structural heart of the aircraft to which the wings and the fuselage are attached, which 
also serves as a fuel tank) and other key systems. Moreover, at manufacturing level, aircraft 
manufacturers’ design and engineering departments have to cope with an ever-growing 
number of programmes, while the production rate is stepped up to ensure delivery.3 The entire 
spectrum of design and production resources available is required to meet these challenges. 
                                                 
1 Within the framework of a research contract co-financed by the Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées regions, a 
qualitative analysis was conducted, predominantly based on data collected from Airbus, hub firms and 
institutional decision-makers. The questionnaires were administered during semi-directive interviews between 
March and June, 2009. The 40 participants interviewed were in senior management positions or occupied 
positions directly linked to the supply chain (quality, purchasing, production, strategy, etc.) 
2 Composite materials already make up 53% of the total structure of the future A350 XWB and comprise 50% of 
the B787’s structure (Air & Cosmos, 30 April 2010). 
3 For instance, deliveries of Airbus aircraft have increased as follows: 42 in 1985, 95 in 1990, 124 in 1995, 311 
in 2000, 378 in 2005, 510 in 2010 and 588 planes in 2012 (see www.airbus.com). 
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To produce such complex aircraft to tighter and tighter deadlines, aircraft manufacturers have 
had to develop strategies that refocus on their core design and manufacturing activities, in 
other words, the upstream activities of design and R&D, and the downstream value chain 
activities of assembly, marketing, and associated services like training and technical support 
(Belussi & Arcangeli, 1998; Frenken, 2000; Mouchnino & Sautel, 2007).4 Aircraft 
manufacturers thus act as both architect and activities integrator (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; 
Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt, 2001). This refocusing strategy has led to a higher level of 
outsourcing of activities with less strategic importance, entrusted to one and two tier 
outsourcers that have to deal with considerable challenges in terms of performance, mass, 
reliability, and financial and price-related risks (Kechidi & Talbot, 2010). 
 
From simple suppliers to hub firms responsible for major components 
Architect-integrators are described in the literature as hub firms at the top of a pyramidal 
supply chain. Prior studies have largely focused on the interactions between order givers and 
order takers in order to understand their dynamics (Takeishi, 2001; Terwiesch, Loch & De 
Meyer A., 2002; O’Sullivan, 2005, 2006). Other studies have examined the network structure, 
suggesting that its core plays a vital role in these new architectures. Many terms have been 
coined to refer to this core, including ‘hub firm’ (Jarillo, 1988), ‘pivot-firm’ (Guilhon & 
Gianfaldoni, 1990), ‘broker’ (Miles & Snow, 1992), ‘local firm’ (Lorenzi & Baden-Fuller, 
1995), ‘flagship firm’ (Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000) and ‘network orchestrator’ (Hacki & 
Lighton, 2001, Dhanasai & Parkhe, 2006), which is in a position to coordinate the network of 
order-takers. The coordinating company must ‘manage a value chain’ (Fulconis & Paché, 
                                                 
4 Boeing and Airbus transferred part of their airframe component manufacturing facilities (cf. the American case 
of the Wichita site acquired by Spirit AeroSystems, or the European Filton site sold to GKN Aerospace, and the 
Laupheim site purchased by Diehl Aerospace), illustrating the refocusing strategy. For other refocusing 
examples, see L’Usine Nouvelle, 14 June 2001; Air & Cosmos, 27 January 2006 and 18 December 2009.  
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2005) and provide ‘local leadership’ over part of the supply chain, notably through the overall 
management of the programmes (Fabbe-Costes, 2005), by managing information flows 
through various communication tools (Lorenzi & Baden-Fuller, 1995), organising the network 
members’ specialisation in view of the asymmetry of power and roles (De Propis, 2001), 
dealing with conflict, and coordinating the different players in the chain (Fréry, 1998). 
In recent years, the notion of hub firm, previously associated with architect-integrators, has 
been extended to strategically-positioned and generally tier-one suppliers (Mazaud, 2006; 
Cagli, Kechidi & Levy, 2009; Gilly, Talbot & Zuliani, 2011). These hub firms develop an 
upstream strategy in the value chain through the design and manufacture of the major 
technical components they are entrusted with (Amesse, et al., 2001). In concrete terms, this 
may involve an entire module (fuselage, doors, nacelles, engines, landing gear, flight control 
systems), module-specific equipment (cockpit equipment, air conditioning systems) or 
relatively standard equipment (video systems, interior furnishings). Thus, they act as 
architects for a homogeneous knowledge base (avionics, airframes, nacelles, landing gear, 
etc.), and strategically position themselves within the supply chain. 
The closer relationship with the chief order giver is coupled with new supply chain 
coordination responsibilities. Hub firms help to integrate the units they are in charge of during 
the final aircraft assembly process. They also adopt an outsourcing strategy for less 
strategically important sub-components. Most aeronautical hub firms work with three 
categories of suppliers (Zuliani, 2008): ‘co-contractors’ with whom they share a joint 
approach to the programme design; ‘technological partners’ who provide off-the-shelf 
equipment in a traditional trade relationship; and specialised, expert outsourcers that make up 
the third group of hub firm suppliers. Hub firms thus play a role that was once entirely 
assumed by the aircraft manufacturers, in other words, they act as intermediaries between the 
architect-integrators and the second or first-tier outsourcers (Talbot, 2013). 
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Hub firms take on more risk 
The rise in the value chain is contingent upon the hub firms’ capacity to assume the risks 
linked to the component’s supply. There is an inherent risk in the way the supply chain is 
organised since it involves players who are unable or unwilling to individually fulfil the 
functions required by their activity (Tapiero, 2005, 2008; Tang, 2006). There is a de facto 
dependency between members in this type of network as the risk undertaken inevitably means 
strings are attached to the relational rent resulting from the supply chains (Agrawal & 
Shesadri, 2000). From the hub firms’ perspective, the risk is heightened across several fronts. 
In the typology proposed by Manuj and Mentzer (2008), these include operational, security, 
demand and macro-economic risks.   
Operational risk generally stems from the fact that outsourcers must produce the component 
they have been entrusted with while meeting their commitments in terms of technical 
specifications, deadlines and cost. At present, difficulties within the aeronautics industry are 
mainly of a technical nature, especially with regard to component integration. The recent 
technical setbacks encountered by Airbus and Boeing when they began production on the 
A380 and B787 demonstrate that there is always a risk in the systems integration process. 
Moreover, operational risk also extends to planes already sold. Should the component be 
technically defective before the contractual deadline, the supplier is responsible for repairing 
or replacing it. 
Hub firms also assume responsibility in terms of security when the system is ready for final 
certification. No new aircraft can fly without first being certified by the public authorities. 
Additionally, in the event of a problem during the certification process, the supplier may be 
subject to a penalty depending on the how far the flaw puts the programme behind schedule. 
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Demand-related risk is linked to the fact that while a selected supplier is almost sure to remain 
in place for the duration of the programme, the equipment will only be paid for once the 
aircraft has been sold, even though the supplier has covered part or all of the investment 
required for the manufacturing costs (Kechidi, 2006). Consequently, they must bear the non-
recurring costs (design and development) which will be depreciated over the number of 
airplanes sold. This is known as risk sharing. The pre-financing of product design and 
development costs, as well as the manufacturing process carried out by the outsourcer, results 
in the financial risk being shared with the constructor, a risk that is tied to the project’s 
success. Pre-financing also means that the architect-integrators can transfer part of the heavy 
investment required to their outsourcers,5 especially as, even if the project is a success, no 
return on investment can be expected before at least twelve years.6 
Finally, from a macro-economic perspective, with the production process becoming more and 
more disaggregated and international, the problem of foreign exchange rate risk is 
increasingly frequent. If a European aircraft manufacturer, as in the case of Airbus, is 
approached by an airline offering to pay in dollars, they still have to settle part of their 
purchases in euros, leaving them open to a potential exchange rate risk. In addition to the 
widely used exchange rate hedging, they may seek to transfer this risk to their suppliers by 
paying for their own orders in dollars. 
In short, hub firms have emerged in response to the new strategies developed by architect-
integrators (cf. table n°1), with a rise in the value chain, management of a network of 
                                                 
5 The investment required for the production of the A350 XWB family of airliners alone (excluding R&D costs, 
making the financial cost considerably higher) amounted to approximately €4bn for Airbus, in addition to the 
investments agreed to by the partners responsible for the airframes, such as Aerolia (€220m), Premium Aerotec 
(€360m), Spirit AeroSystems (€400m) and GKN Aerospace (€140m). However, in return, Airbus received 
repayable public loans worth €3.23bn for the programme (Air & Cosmos, 30 April 2010). 
6 The break-even point for a programme such as the A380 is reached when about 460 aircrafts are delivered and 
paid for (Air & Cosmos, 4 June 2011). In June 2012, 253 orders were placed for A380 airliners, 75 of which 
have now been delivered with the rest scheduled for delivery over several years (cf. www.airbus.com). 
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outsourcers, and greater risk-taking that, combined, turn a manufacturer into a hub firm, in 
other words, an architect-integrator of entire sub-assemblies.  
 
Table 1: Sector-specific dynamics and strategic responses in the aeronautics industry (2000-2010) 
 
Sector-specific dynamics Architect-integrator strategies 
(Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, 
Embraer) 
Hub firm strategies (e.g. Creuzet, 
Mecahers, Liebherr Aerospace 
Toulouse, Sogeclair Aerospace, 
Ratier Figeac) 
 
Greater product complexity 
 
Greater range of expertise 
 
Programme acceleration  
 
Increased production volumes 
 
 
 
Refocusing both upstream and 
downstream the value chain 
 
Outsourcing to tier-1  firms 
 
 
 
Rise in the value chain 
 
Intermediation between 
architect-integrators and lower-
tier outsourcers 
 
Risk-taking 
 
  
Source: the authors 
 
In the next section we describe how the prerequisites for creating relational rents are met 
following the emergence of hub firms.  
 
Prerequisites for creating relational rents 
In order to generate relational rents, inter-organisational relations need to be idiosyncratic 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). More specifically, Dyer and Singh maintain that four conditions are 
required: partners need to invest in specific association-related assets, substantial and routine 
exchange of expertise to foster mutual learning, a combination of complementary and scarce 
resources and competencies that lead to the joint production of new products, services or 
technologies and, finally, governance mechanisms to manage the exchange-based 
relationship. In the aeronautics industry, these conditions are created as soon as a new project 
begins, and are maintained throughout the industrial production phase (cf. table 2).  
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Table 2: Empirical conditions for relational rents in the aeronautics industry 
 
Prerequisites for  relational rent Design and industrial 
production phases 
Benefits 
Specifically dedicated assets 
Collocated contracting teams,7 digital 
models, production tools, strategic 
human capital 
 
Enhanced engineering 
productivity 
 
 
Knowledge exchange 
 
 
Systematic exchange of expertise 
(platforms, models) and selection 
(e.g. Bombardier), PMR (e.g. Airbus), 
scheduling and planning software, 
interface tools 
 
Fewer challenges linked to 
location and acquisition costs 
Combined resources and 
competencies Joint specialization 
 
Decrease in mass, production and 
maintenance costs 
 
Governance mechanisms 
 
Selection process, PMR [portable 
mobile radio], scheduling and 
planning software, interface tools 
 
Reduced coordination costs, 
opportunism, self-regulation 
Source: the authors 
 
 
Dedicated assets 
Lavie (2006) argues that relational rents can only be generated from a pool of shared assets, 
while Amit and Shoemaker (1993) believe that asset specificity is a key condition to 
producing this type of rent. Williamson (1994), on the other hand, demonstrated that benefits 
can be generated through exchange as long as companies are willing to commit specific 
investments to the relationship. He identified three categories of asset specificity: (i) site 
specificity, in that creating a specific organisational structure for inter-organisational relations 
allows partners to work together in the same place (Dumoulin & François, 2002). This 
geographic proximity helps to cut down on coordination costs (Dyer, 1996) by facilitating 
                                                 
7 Mixed collocated contracting teams involve main order giver teams and main subcontractor teams working 
together on a project in the same place. 
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exchange of knowledge, especially tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1983); (ii) physical and 
intangible asset specificity promotes product differentiation and can act as a source of 
performance enhancement (Nishiguchi, 1994); (iii) the same applies to individuals who have 
gained specific skills and know-how over the course of their relationships (Asanuma, 1989).  
Collocated contracting teams illustrate how specific assets can be allocated to the architect-
integrators and hub firm relationship. During the aircraft design stage, teams of engineers 
from both the architect-integrators and the hub firms are brought together on one site for a 
number of months. Their purpose is to decide on the aircraft’s overall architecture, to jointly 
establish the interfaces between the different modules and to hone the technical solutions. 
These goals imply considerable knowledge exchange, facilitated by the face-to-face 
interaction made possible by this temporary geographic proximity, in particular with regard to 
tacit knowledge (Torre, 2008). Moreover, with each new programme, engineers share R&D 
tools that are often brand new, in addition to pooling the know-how accumulated by previous 
collocated contracting teams. Airbus created its first mixed contracting team in Toulouse for 
the development of the A340-500/600 line back in 1997 (Zuliani, 2008; Jalabert & Zuliani, 
2009). Likewise, the A380 and the A350 XWB lines were also assigned a dedicated team in 
Toulouse, comprising a thousand or so engineers and technicians in both instances. The 
contracting team is then dissolved as the transition is made to a ‘virtual platform’ via 
simultaneous engineering technology. Other specific assets then come into play, in our case 
intangible assets such as digital models designed by the architect-integrator and updated in 
real time by the hub firms via a secure network. Thanks to these assets and a context of 
growing R&D spending due to greater product complexity and the capping of resources, in 
the last ten years Airbus has shortened the aircraft development phase from 7.5 to 6 years and 
improved overall engineering productivity by 15% (reduced spending on senior engineers’ 
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travel expenses, fewer items to handle, shorter development cycles, etc.) (Igalens & Vicens, 
2006). 
During the programme’s industrial production phase, which could span decades in the event 
of commercial success (the A320 made its maiden flight in 1984), incremental innovations are 
integrated into the product, which justifies preserving specific assets such as digital models. 
Moreover, the acceleration of programmes and the highly technological entry barriers which 
remain prevalent in the aeronautics industry result in architect-integrators repeatedly working 
with the same hub firms from one programme to the next. Thales Avionics thus furnishes the 
avionic components for the entire Airbus line. In reality, the same engineers are assigned to 
different collocated contracting teams, enabling them to develop the expertise required for this 
type of organisation. Should the contracting team be dissolved between two programmes, the 
precious human capital is strategically retained within the company. Naturally, many 
production tools are designed and produced specifically for each programme,8 and can be 
found in the different partner facilities (final assembly lines, production lines for dedicated 
components). In effect, each programme’s unique features mean hub firms generally develop 
and manufacture components that meet the demands of specific architect-integrators (Airbus, 
Boeing, Embraer, Bombardier, Comac, Dassault, etc.).  
 
Considerable routine exchange of knowledge 
Routine knowledge sharing has a positive impact on both innovation and performance as the 
pooling of intelligence through the recombination and passing on of expertise (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006) fosters the emergence of new ideas and know-how. Such interaction models 
                                                 
8 For example, Spirit AeroSystems opened a manufacturing facility in North Carolina to produce airframe 
components exclusively for the A350 XWB. Daher and GKN Aerospace have also made investments 
specifically for that programme (Air et Cosmos, 30 April 2010).  
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facilitate the transfer, recombination and generation of highly specific knowledge (Grant, 
1996). Collocated contracting teams and digital models form specific assets whose use has 
given rise to the development of this type of routine knowledge-sharing between 
geographically and organisationally dispersed engineers. All the more so given that the latter 
often maintain long-term relationships that further encourage such exchanges. Thus, the 
challenges of geographic proximity can be at least partly alleviated during the design phase. 
During the manufacturing stage that follows, knowledge exchange is further enhanced by a 
routine interaction model. Airbus launched a ‘Program Meeting Review’ (PMR) in the 1990s, 
whose purpose was set out in the outsourcing contract: it involves frequent, monthly or bi-
monthly meetings to allow the architect-integrator and the hub firm to assess the work in 
progress and to oversee the technical aspects of the activities. A large number of information 
systems9 and interface tools are used alongside the interaction model in place so that 
architect-integrators can communicate with both the hub firms and further afield,10 leading to 
huge savings on procurement costs for the architect-integrators. Each new programme gives 
aircraft manufacturers the opportunity to purchase components at lower cost, with savings of 
around 20%.11 
 
A combination of complementary resources and competencies 
The complementarity between architect-integrators’ and hub firms’ resources and skills 
fosters new forms of innovation in aircraft design and subsequently impacts on the potential 
                                                 
9 Airbus uses ERP production programmes as well as Advanced planning & scheduling software with its hub 
firms (Air & Cosmos, 12 October 2007). 
10 Airbus uses Sup@irworld while Boeing favours Exostar (Air & Cosmos, 12 October 2007). 
11 The Airbus ‘Route 06’ programme is the most striking example to date. Among other things, it envisaged 
reducing supply costs by 15% between 2003 and 2006, amounting to around €500 million savings, totalling €1.5 
billion in cumulative cost savings for miscellaneous expenses (development, production, structure). The Power 8 
and Power 8+ programmes, launched in 2007, are expected to improve Airbus’ earnings before interest and tax 
(Ebit) by €2.1 billion, and to secure additional cash flow worth €5 billion over three years (Air & Cosmos, 23 
November 2007 and 18 December 2009; La Tribune, 19 December 2007). 
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to generate relational rents (Shan & Hamilton, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 
1998). This complementarity can be observed in so-called ‘co-specification relationships’. 
Co-specification refers to the joint effort to generate the specific and vital technical 
knowledge needed to drive a project forward (O’Sullivan, 2006). It also gives rise to shared 
architectural knowledge about the way components are integrated and interconnected as a 
coherent whole (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Hub firms are in a position to offer new technical 
solutions to the architect-integrator, promoting their rise in the value chain, while the latter 
can reap the benefits of the hub firm’s innovation skills. 
In the case of the A380 airliner, two major technological breakthroughs resulted from the co-
specification process between Airbus and hub firms, giving the product a competitive edge. 
Certain components had to be decentralised as the aircraft’s size effectively required 
decentralised hydraulic and electric systems to be developed in order to minimize the 
components’ mass. Airbus, Messier-Bugatti and Sofrance (Safran) replaced the old 
centralised systems, which were entirely hydraulic and connected by a complex set of circuits, 
by electro-hydraulic systems dedicated to each piece of equipment. Other manufacturers 
preferred to shift from a decentralised to a centralised strategy. Before the A340 programme 
was developed, computers for the avionics systems were designed to fulfil one single 
function. In this configuration, adding new on-board functions to the aircraft required new 
computers and new connections, implying evermore equipment and a subsequent increase in 
the aircraft’s mass as well as in maintenance costs. The integrated modular architecture 
developed by Airbus and Thales Avionics for the A380 (as well as by Boeing and Smiths 
Aerospace for the B787 aircraft, referred to as the ‘Common Core System’) consists of 
abandoning the principle of a dedicated resource, so that one computer can serve different 
purposes, leading to a gain in mass and lower production and maintenance costs (Cagli, 
Kechidi & Levy, 2009). 
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 Robust governance mechanisms 
According to Boeing, 70% of the 787 model is outsourced, while Airbus relies on outsourcers 
for about 80% of its aircraft value.12 Given the high level of outsourcing, governance 
mechanisms need to be set up to manage the interchange as efficiently as possible (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Such mechanisms need to guard against opportunism by the partners (Dhanasai 
& Parkhe, 2006) and, from the architect-integrators’ perspective, to guarantee the hub firms’ 
competencies and continued financial viability.13 Studies on how inter-organisational 
relationships are handled have identified two complementary forms of control: formal and 
informal. Formal control is based on the partners’ contractual commitments and is 
underpinned by target-related and explicit mechanisms. Penalties applicable in the event of 
non-conformity are essentially of a judicial nature. The system is designed to manage 
outcomes using different, highly codified mechanisms (Dekker, 2004), and to guide behaviour 
through standardised procedures (Ouchi, 1979). Informal control, on the other hand, is 
essentially founded on tacit self-regulatory mechanisms that are influenced by the 
psychological and social characteristics of those who implement them. In the event of non-
conformity, sanctions are of a more or less moral nature. Trust has proved a particularly 
effective control tool with regard to inter-organisational relationships (Dekker, 2004). Ex-
ante, informal control mechanisms mean that partners can be chosen both for their 
competencies and according to their assumed ability to meet common goals. Ex-post, trust is 
generated through successful repeat interactions (achieving goals, problem resolution, loyalty, 
etc.) and the fact that each partner is better acquainted with the other party’s expectations.  
                                                 
12 Air & Cosmos, 12 October 2007. 
13 In 2006, Boeing provided financial and human resources for two struggling hub firms: Mitsubishi was in 
charge of manufacturing the wings for the 787 and the mid-fuselage section was entrusted to Alenia Aeronautica.  
17 
 
Formal and informal control processes are introduced once the architect-integrator has 
selected the hub firms. Cagli, Kechidi and Levy (2009) describe the selection mechanisms 
used by Airbus for the A380 and A350 XWB programmes. The teams from each partner form 
part of a three-stage organisational framework. The preliminary pre-collocated team stage 
consists of defining market needs and the techniques available to satisfy them. This occurs at 
a very early stage of the plane manufacturing process, free from any contractual obligations, 
and allows Airbus to monitor the competencies of each party and to ensure that confidentiality 
is respected. Any form of opportunistic behaviour by the hub firm will be sanctioned by 
Airbus and result in the partnership being terminated. Otherwise, a relationship of trust 
gradually develops, reducing coordination costs through the self-regulatory mechanisms that 
such relations engender. During the second stage, Airbus formally selects one or more 
competing hub firms. At this point, technical features, price and deadlines are discussed. The 
hub firm’s capacity to shoulder the risks and to finance the development phase of the 
components is also closely scrutinized. The third phase secures the mutual agreement between 
the partners and the technical characteristics, price and deadlines are then agreed upon.14 
The routines introduced to exchange expertise during the industrial production phase also give 
architect-integrators an opportunity to monitor the hub firm. The ‘PRM’ meeting system, for 
instance, offers a means to resolve situations that are not explicitly included in the initial 
contract, to fill gaps in contract provisions and to ensure that commitments undertaken during 
the selection phase are being met (formal control). Respect nurtures the trust accumulated 
over the course of the different programmes jointly undertaken by the partners (informal 
control). More generally, the information systems and interface tools are designed to formally 
monitor adherence to schedules, quality standards and procedure implementation.  
                                                 
14 When the Canadian architect-integrator Bombardier launched a new programme, a similar, five-stage formal 
and informal system was adopted.  
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In short, once the empirical conditions for the emergence of relational rents are in place, hub 
firms in the aeronautics industry should in theory financially outperform other outsourcers. 
We put this hypothesis to the test in sections 2 and 3, comparing the statistical performance of 
hub firms with that of sub-contracting firms overall. We include statistical data in section 2 
that is further substantiated by an econometric analysis in section 3.  
 
Financial performance of subcontractors in the aeronautics industry 
In this section we identify the hub firms from among the other subcontractors in the 
aeronautics industry, analyse their accounts to highlight their specific characteristics, and 
conduct a statistical analysis of their financial performance. 
 
Defining samples and identifying hub firms 
A comparative analysis of hub firms’ financial situation was performed on outsourcers in the 
aeronautics industry based in the Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées regions. We used two sources 
of information: financial data came from the Diane database, while subcontracting firms, and 
more particularly hub firms, were identified from the annual INSEE survey on subcontracting 
organisations, suppliers and service providers in the aeronautics and aerospace sector. The 
survey includes all organisations from Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées that have been 
commissioned for outsourcing work by one of the architect-integrators in the aeronautics and 
aerospace industry, totalling almost 1100 organisations. We decided to restrict the analysis to 
businesses with a sufficiently high turnover (> 20 %), giving us 578 organisations. We then 
selected the 273 companies whose financial data was available in the Diane database for the 
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period 2000-2007.15 The use of a constant sample enabled us to conduct trend analyses 
(Stolowy, Lebas & Langlois, 2006). 
The criteria selected to distinguish hub firms from other industry players, particularly from 
tier-one suppliers, reflects the definition presented in the first section, in other words, hub 
firm are distinguished by their rise in the value chain, responsibility for a major component, 
management of a network of outsourcers and greater risk-taking. We can comprehend the 
technological and relational aspects from certain criteria in the annual INSEE survey. The 
following five conditions need to be met for a company to be considered a tier-1 hub firm: it 
must be a specialised tier-1 outsourcer working in the context of a global offer or a global 
manufacturing offer. A hub firm’s activity is not limited to subcontracting activities 
exclusively. Hub firms propose a specialised offer, offering specific expertise that the order-
givers lack (i); in turn, it uses other outsourcers for aeronautics-related activities (ii); as a key 
partner, it must hold the accreditation required (iii) ; it employs staff in a design department or 
a design and engineering department, as hub firms work with the architect-integrator to co-
design the units or sub-assemblies they are entrusted with (iv); as an extension of the previous 
criterion, the firm offers R&D/design and/or production services(v). 
In total, we identified 42 hub firms and found the financial data for the selected period (2000-
2007) for all of them. The complementary sample comprises 231 companies representing all 
levels of subcontractors.  
 
                                                 
15 The financial data was retrieved in the framework of the research contract for ‘regional hub firms in the 
aeronautics industry: the power 8 plan and the restructuring of the subcontractor network in Aquitaine and Midi 
Pyrénées, financed by the Conseils Régionaux [regional authorities] in these regions between 2007-2010. Data 
retrieval was performed in 2009. In view of the delay in publishing company accounts and the period required 
for registration in the Diane database, 2007 was selected as it was the year when information was available for 
the largest number of firms. Selecting the year 2008 would have considerably reduced our final sample size. 
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Hub firms with distinctive characteristics 
We first examine how hub firms’ balance sheets (Table 3) and profit and loss accounts (Table 
4) compare to those of other subcontractors in the aeronautics industry and then consider the 
possible implications in terms of financial performance and risk (Table 5).16 To examine the 
specific characteristics of hub firms, a static analysis was performed for the year 2007, in 
addition to a cross-sectional analysis of changes for the period 2000-2007. The balance sheet 
and profit and loss account items are presented respectively in percentage of total 
asset/liability and net turnover (Stolowy, Lebas & Langlois, 2006). Average ratios for the 
different categories of companies are calculated from inflation-adjusted data. This neutralises 
the relative importance of the company insofar as we analyse ratios per individual company 
so the results reflect the behaviour of companies as a group rather than that of a company with 
significant presence. Given the already limited sample size of our different groups, aberrant 
values have been removed from the analysis while extreme values have been preserved. The 
median analysis thus confirms the conclusions drawn from the analysis of averages. Using 
medians helps us understand the behaviour of the majority of firms without the extreme 
behaviours that would skew our conclusions. 
The analysis of the specific characteristics of hub firms consequently suggests that their 
position as intermediaries involves larger intermediary stocks and consumption, while risk-
taking is also comparatively higher, resulting in weaker financial performance overall.   
 
Position as intermediary 
Large stocks 
The balance sheet structure of hub firms is highly specific, particularly with regard to their 
level of current assets. These companies appear to hold substantial levels of stocks (27.3% of 
                                                 
16 We describe the method that underpinned our analysis in Appendices 1 and 2, along with the main indicators 
used and their definition.  
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their total balance, twice the rate of non-hub firms in our sample at 12.8%). Stock levels were 
particularly high between 2000 and 2007, rising by 7.6% against 2.2% for the sample overall. 
This can be explained by the hub firms’ role as intermediary, which led them to act as a 
logistics platform in that they provide storage for the unit they are in charge of for the 
architect-integrator. Moreover, the hub firms’ stock turnover rate is extremely low. With 
around 100 business days and a fairly steep growth period between 2000 and 2007, stock 
turnover was almost treble that of the daily rate of the other firms. 
 
Table 3: Balance sheet structure for hub firms, non-hub firms and the overall sample 
 
  2007  
 
2000-2007 (a) 
 Hub Non-hub Tot. sample  Hub Non-hub Tot. sample 
Amount of data collected 
 
42 
 
231 
 
273 
  
42 
 
231 
 
273 
        
  Net fixed assets 20.8% 20.3% 20.4%  0.4% -1.4% -1.1% 
    Net intangible assets 
 
3.9% 
 
4.5% 
 
4.4% 
  
2.1% 
 
1.3% 
 
1.4% 
    Net tangible assets 14.0% 13.1% 13.3%  -1.9% -1.6% -1.6% 
    Net financial assets 2.9% 2.7% 2.7%  0.2% -1.1% -0.9% 
            
  Net current assets 78.2% 78.6% 78.6%  0.3% 1.7% 1.5% 
    Net stocks *** 
 
27.3% 
 
12.8% 
 
15.1% 
  
***7.6% 
 
2.2% 
 
3% 
    Net accounts receivable*** 
33.3% 42.5% 41.1%  ***-
8.3% 
-2.2% -3.1% 
    Net marketable securities** 2.3% 5% 4.6%  -0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 
    Net cash assets*** 4.8% 10.1% 9.3%  0.4% -0.3% -0.2% 
    Net current assets 10.4% 8.1% 8.4%  0.8% 1.6% 1.5% 
            
   Accruals 1% 1% 1%  -0.7% -0.3% -0.3% 
          
  TOTAL ASSETS 100% 100% 100%     
        
  Equity 35.4% 38.6% 38.1%  1.5% 4.4% 4.0% 
Corporate share capital 
 
10.4% 
 
9.9% 
 
10% 
  
-0.2% 
 
-1.1% 
 
-1% 
    Operating result 3.5% 6.8% 6.3%  -1.8% 0.3% 0% 
    Reserves and adjustments  19.6% 20.9% 20.7%  3.2% 5% 4.7% 
    Investment subsidies* 0.4% 0.7% 0.6%  *-0.1% 0.1% 0% 
    Regulated provisions** 1.4% 0.4% 0.5%  **0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
            
  Misc. capital and provisions 0.7% 0.2% 0.3%  0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 
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  Risk and contingency provisions* 2.6% 1.3% 1.5%  *-0.4% -0.2% -0.2% 
          
  Liabilities 59.8% 58.8% 58.9%  -0.8% -4.6% -4% 
    Financial liabilities 
 
12.6% 
 
11.9% 
 
12% 
  
-0.2% 
 
-2% 
 
-1.7% 
    Bank loans, overdrafts & credit bal. 1.9% 1.5% 1.5%  -2.3% -0.7% -0.9% 
    Accounts payable*** 23% 18.5% 19.2%  -0.9% -1.5% -1.4% 
    Tax and social liabilities** 16.1% 21.2% 20.4%  -0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 
    Miscellaneous liabilities 6.2% 5.7% 5.8%  ***2.9% -0.7% -0.1% 
            
    Accruals 1.4% 1.1% 1.2%  -0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 
          
  TOTAL LIABILITIES 100% 100% 100%     
   
Source: calculations made by the authors based on data from the greffe des tribunaux de commerce (Diane) 
(a) Percentage point increase 
Significant difference between hub and non-hub firms: (*) 10%, (**) 5%, (***) 1% 
 
 
 
High levels of consumption 
The intermediary position occupied by hub firms also accounts for their elevated levels of 
consumption, which represented 55.6% of their turnover in 2007 against 40.2% for non-hub 
firms. A large proportion of consumption is due to ‘miscellaneous purchases and external 
expenditure’ (39.9% of the turnover), which includes ‘general outsourcing services’. 
Consumption levels rose by more than 7.0 points between 2000 and 2007, compared to 
relative stability for the other firms in our sample. This indicates a higher level of outsourcing 
by hub firms. Thus, the rate of added value only accounts for 45.6% of hub firms’ turnover, 
against 56.4% for the rest of the sample. 
 
Accepting greater risk 
High level of provisions 
The level of provisions, whether regulated provisions (which include provisions against price 
increases and exchange rate fluctuation) or contingency provisions, is significantly higher 
than our sample average: respectively 1.4% and 2.6% of the total balance in 2007 for hub 
firms against 0.4% and 1.3% for the other companies surveyed. This might be due to the way 
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the integrator-architects transfer risks (operational, security, demand and macro-economic) to 
hub firms. The accounting data is organised so that all the provisions against inherent risks 
related to the entity’s activities, such as guarantees given to clients or transactions in foreign 
currencies, are recorded in the accounts.  
 
A fragile financial structure  
We observed a situation of contained risk with respect to the structure of hub firms’ asset 
liquidity and loan repayments. At the same time, the level of risk rose over the period 2000-
2007.17 From the general and reduced liquidity ratios, we can see that hub firms are able to 
repay their debts in the short term, but their ability to do so is more limited than that of the 
other firms in our sample.  
The amount of stock significantly impacts on the need for finance linked to the hub firms’ 
operating cycle, which we measured through working capital requirements. It was estimated 
at over 86 business days for the year 2007, compared to 48 days for the other outsourcers in 
our sample. However, it is far lower than the working capital requirements in 2007, which 
registered over 106 business days. Hub firms pay for most of their working capital 
requirements through financial liabilities (the median of financial liabilities for hub firms is 
nearly double that of other outsourcers). This level of debt has a significant impact on their 
independence and financial autonomy, with these ratios below the average of other firms at 
36.2% (against 38.8%) and 42.9% (against 47.7%), respectively. While this situation enables 
them to partially offset their total stocks, it also puts them in a more vulnerable position. 
Consequently, while the overall debt and debt load ratio of hub firms remains acceptable, it is 
nonetheless well above average. The indebtedness of hub firms can be observed in the 
                                                 
17 Table 5 includes all the structure and asset liquidity indicators used in our analysis for the year 2007 as well as 
the transverse evolution observed between 2000 and 2007.  
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interest/turnover ratio, which is more than double than that of the other firms surveyed. 
Likewise, the self-financing capacity of hub firms is below that of other firms in the sector 
(averaging 5.7% against 7.1%). This suggests that a higher percentage of its capacity is 
earmarked to pay off its financial liabilities (the repayment capacity indicator and total 
interest on added value is almost 3% against an average 1.4% for the rest of the sample).  
 
Potentially higher risk of bankruptcy 
The Conan and Holder score (1979) analysis gives us an indication of the bankruptcy risk for 
different types of companies. It provides an overall score using ratios deemed by the authors 
to be most indicative of risk of bankruptcy. The level of scores obtained (15.5 and 20.9 
respectively for hub and non-hub firms) again helps us to put the two categories into 
perspective. In effect, the ratio level suggests a bankruptcy risk below 10%. However, the 
score of the hub firms in the sector nonetheless showed them to be at a disadvantage. 
 
Weaker financial performance 
The significantly lower payroll costs (35% of turnover vs. 44.2% on average for non-hub 
firms) cannot offset the high level of consumption. The overall result indicates lower earnings 
before interest and net result compared to those recorded by the other firms in our sample. If 
we compare the results for the fiscal years 2000 and 2007, the same indicators showed a 
stronger decline for hub firms than for other stakeholders in the subcontracting chain. 
Similarly, the substantial degree of intermediate consumption observed among hub firms has 
a strong bearing on productivity ratios. The productivity of the production potential attained 
by hub firms was 1.8 against 3.2 on average for the other firms, even though the former 
record higher productive investment rates (11.7% against 8.6%). On a larger scale, the 
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invested capital productivity rate is also lower at 0.46 against an average of 0.67. The amount 
of investment combined with the level of total stocks has a strong impact on the level of 
productivity. If we consider the return on equity and fixed assets, we reach the same 
conclusion, namely, lower profitability and sluggish development during the period of 
analysis. 
Table 4: Profit and loss account of hub firms, non-hub firms and the overall sample 
 
 2007  2000-2007 (a) 
 Hub Non-hub Tot. sample  Hub Non-hub Tot. sample 
 
Amount of data collected 
 
42 
 
231 
 
273 
  
42 
 
231 
 
273 
        
 Net turnover sales (net of tax) 100% 100% 100%     
   Exports*** 16.7% 6.6% 8.1%  -4.8% 0.7% -0.2% 
        
 Purchase of goods and other 
supplies*** 
20.9% 15.3% 16.2%  *2.5% -0.5% -0.1% 
   Merchandise*** 0.3% 4.6% 4%  -1.6% -0.4% -0.6% 
   Pr. and other supplies*** 20.6% 10.7% 12.2%  **4.1% -0.1% 0.5% 
        
 Year-end production* 98.2% 94% 94.6%  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
 + Sales margin 2.9% 2.6% 2.6%  2.1% 0.5% 0.8% 
 - Year-end expenses*** 55.6% 40.2% 42.6%  ***7.3% -0.4% 0.8% 
   Incl. other exp. and ext. costs** 35.9% 29.7% 30.7%  *3.3% -0.4% 0.2% 
        
 Added value*** 45.6% 56.4% 54.7%  ***-5.0% 0.9% 0% 
 - Labour costs*** 35% 44.2% 42.7%  -2.2% -1% -1.2% 
 - Taxes and contributions 3% 2.9% 2.9%  0.1% 0% 0% 
 + Operating subsidies 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%  -0.5% -0.4% -0.4% 
        
 Gross operating income before 
depreciation and amortisation 
7.9% 9.7% 9.4%  *-3.4% 1.5% 0.7% 
 + Misc. provisions, expenses and 
write-backs** 
2.5% 1.1% 1.4%  -0.7% -2.8% -2.5% 
 - Operating expenses, depreciation 
allowances and provisions 
4.4% 3.4% 3.6%  -2.3% -1.5% -1.6% 
        
 Operating income 6% 7.4% 7.2%  -1.8% 0.1% -0.2% 
 + Joint ventures 0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 
 + Revenue ** 1.8% 0.7% 0.8%  0.1% -0.3% -0.2% 
 - Expenses*** 1.9% 0.9% 1%  -0.9% -0.4% -0.5% 
   Interest payable and similar*** 1.1% 0.7% 0.8%  0.1% -0.2% -0.1% 
        
 Earnings before tax 6% 7.2% 7%  -0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 
 + Extraordinary income 2.1% 1.2% 1.4%  -1.3% -0.2% -0.3% 
 - Extraordinary charges 2.4% 0.9% 1.1%  0.2% -0.3% -0.3% 
 - Employee profit sharing*** 0.7% 0.2% 0.3%  0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 
 - Income taxes - deferred taxes 1.5% 2% 1.9%  -1.3% -0.5% -0.6% 
        
 Profit and loss 3.5% 5.4% 5.1%  -1.2% 0.8% 0.5% 
26 
 
        
Outsourcing 2.8% 2.1% 2.2%  -1.9% -0.7% -1% 
External contract staff 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%  -0.3% -0.1% -0.1% 
Total misc. purchases and other 
external costs 
6.3% 5.9% 6%  6.3% 6.1% 6% 
   
  Source: calculations by the authors from the greffe des tribunaux de commerce database (Diane) 
(a) Percentage point increase 
Statistical significance between hub and non-hub firms: (*) 10%, (**) 5%, (***) 1% 
 
 
Overall, the hub firms’ balance sheet and profit and loss account for the year 2007 revealed 
the relative weakness of their financial performance indicators. The way these indicators 
evolved over the period 2000-2007 suggests a clear decline. 
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Table 5: Profitability and risk indicators for hub firms, non-hub firms and the overall sample 
 
 2007  2000-2007   2007  2000-2007 
 Hub Non-
hub 
Total  Hub Non-
hub 
total   Hub Non-
hub 
Total  Hub Non-
hub 
total 
Structure and (asset) liquidity         Margin and added value        
                 
1. Financial equilibrium 1.9 2.3 2.3  0 0.4 0.4  1. Sales margin (%)* 84 37.4 43.8 *** 34.0 -191.5 -72.6 
2. Financial independence (%) 42.8 47.7 46.9  0.8 8.6 8.3  2. Added value rate (%)*** 45.6 56.3 54.7 ** -5 0.9 0 
3. Debt (%) 17.1 13.7 14.3  -0.4 -9.5 -8.6  3. Employee profit sharing (%) 78.4 78.7 78.7  2.7 -0.2 0.2 
4. Financial autonomy (%) 36.2 38.8 38.4  1.8 4.5 4.1  4. Government share (%) 10 9.2 9.4  -1.4 -0.3 -0.5 
5. Degree of depreciation of tangible 
fixed assets (%) 
64.8 69.7 69.0 ** 1.6 9.4 7.3  5. Lenders’ share (%)** 2.7 1.4 1.6  0.6 -1.8 -1.4 
6. Financing of net current assets 0.4 0.4 0.4  0 0 0.1  6. Self-financing share (%) 12.5 12.9 12.9  0.6 0.5 0.6 
7. General liquidity 1.9 2.1 2.1  0 0.1 0.1          
8. Reduced liquidity 1.2 1.8 1.7  -0.2 0.1 0          
                 
Management         Productivity and profitability        
                 
1. Stock rotation (D)*** 96.2 33.4 43.2  29.9 9 9.9  1. Economic efficiency 
(thousand/employees) 
59.6 88.7 84.1  4.8 57.1 34.9 
2. Trade receivables (D) 83.4 90.6 89.6 ** -19.5 -4.1 -7.9  2. Prod. of production potential*** 1.8 3.2 3  -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 
3. Trade accounts payable (D)*** 94.6 77.8 80.4  -12.3 -6.5 -7.5  3. Productivity of financial capital*** 0.8 1.2 1.1  -0.1 -0 -0.1 
4. Turnover per workforce 
(thousand/employees) 
137.6 160.1 156.6  19.1 72.9 44.3  4. Productivity invested capital*** 0.5 0.7 0.6  -0.1 -0 0 
5. Financial interest rate (%)** 1.1 0.7 0.8  0.1 -0.2 -0.1  5. Productive investment rate (%) 11.7 8.6 9.1  -4.7 -13 -9.5 
6. Interests / turnover (%)*** 1.9 0.8 1  -0.9 -0.5 -0.4  6. Economic rate of return (%) 7.9 9.7 9.4 * -3.4 1.3 0.7 
7. Total debt (D)** 179.0 147.1 152  4.5 -9.7 -7.5  7. Performance (%) 5.9 7.2 7  -0.8 0.1 0 
8. Debt ratio (%) 63.6 61.4 61.8  -43.3 -34.2 -35.6  8. Gross return of net equity (%) (a) 23.3 -23.4 28.7 * -3 -95.8 -1.4 
9. Capacity to repay -0.5 1.4 1.1  -1.2 0.2 0.1  9. Net profitability (%) 3.5 5.4 5.1  -1.2 0.8 0.5 
10. Self-financing capacity (%) 5.6 7.1 6.9  -1.1 0.8 0.6  10. Net return on equity (%) 18.6 -43.9 -34.2  -3 -90.9 -72.1 
11. Working capital turnover cover (D) 106.6 92.2 94.5  15.8 7.3 9  11. Net return on sustainable resources 
(%) 
18.8 28.7 27.2  -0.6 4.5 15 
12. Working capital requirement turnover 
cover (D)** 
86 48.6 54.4  8.5 8.5 8.6          
13. Burden of WCR (%)*** 61.6 45.2 47.8  3.4 1.7 2  Solvency ratio (%) 0.12 -0.18 0.05  0.02 -0.4 0.02 
14. Exports (%)** 16.7 6.6 8.1  -4.8 0.7 -0.2  Conan-Holder Score (NPC) 15.5 20.9 20  -2.9 1.4 0.8 
Source: calculated by the authors from the greffe des tribunaux de commerce database (Diane) 
(a) Data expressed in medians 
Statistical significance between hub and non-hub firms: (*) 10%, (**) 5%, (***) 1% 
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Econometric analysis of subcontracting firm determinants in the field of 
aeronautics 
The apparently weaker financial performance18 of hub firms observed at statistic level could 
be imputable to factors other than the specific position these companies occupy. Hub firms 
may simply be part of a less profitable sub-sector. Their distinctive features would thus be due 
to their sector of origin rather than their role as a hub. Size, region, and other control variables 
could also be at the root of their unique situation. In order to verify our previous conclusions 
and to isolate the impact of the hub firm situation, we performed an econometric study that 
takes the ‘hub’ dimension into consideration, along with a set of control variables. 
This analysis of the profitability drivers of subcontracting firms led us to test two hypotheses: 
first, tier-1 hub firms record lower profitability (profitability effect); second, the profitability 
of these same hub firms is much less consistent than other companies (redistributional effect). 
Should there be any annual profits, they are subsequently captured by the other players in the 
value chain (e.g. by the order-givers). 
 
Econometric model 
The estimated econometric model establishes a linear relationship between the profitability, or 
ROA, of a firm for the period 2000-2007, the lagged effect, its role as a hub firm (I), an 
interaction term and a set of explanatory control variables (X): 
 
(1) titititititititi evuXROAIIROAROA ,,41,,3,21,1, *     
                                                 
18 Our econometric analysis focuses on financial performance for several reasons: firstly, the present paper seeks 
to examine the financial performance of subcontractors in the field of aeronautics following the profound 
changes identified. Secondly, performing an econometric analysis of storage and risk-related activities was 
extremely challenging since there are several types of stock (raw materials, work-in-process, finished goods) in a 
company and many reasons why they might be in storage (smooth work flow, acceleration, cycle stock…). This 
made the econometric analysis of storage strategies difficult. The same applies to supplies, as the motives and 
reasons also vary significantly. Likewise, given that risk is essentially evaluated by a score, the econometric 
analysis of risk is difficult insofar as the score is a linear combination of several ratios that may serve as 
explanatory variables. Finally, profitability is closely linked to the level of inventory while strongly influencing 
the company’s risk level. 
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where u is the specific individual effect, v is the temporary specific effect and e is the error 
term.  
 
This specification is similar to that of Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) and Estrin, Poukliakova 
and Shapiro (2009).  
The profitability ratio (ROA) is defined as the ratio between a company’s total earnings or 
losses divided by its total assets. This variable is correlated with a hub firm’s position and 
prior profitability to express the redistributional effect (Lincoln & Gerlach, 2004; Estrin, 
Poukliakova & Shapiro, 2009).  
We then took several control variables (X) into consideration: i.e., size, turnover growth rate, 
debt, the region where the firm is based and temporary sector-specific indicators. Size was 
measured as the logarithm of total assets. This took into account returns to scale and large 
firms’ market power. Turnover growth rate was used to factor in the volume of demand for 
the company’s products. Two contradictory effects can be observed: first, turnover growth 
might be synonymous with increased market power and thereby increase profitability. 
Secondly, overly rapid growth might entail costly adjustments and thus reduce profitability. 
The company’s financial structure, which can be expressed by the ratio of debt over total 
assets, is also included in the equation since it is likely to considerably boost profitability. 
Regional and sector-related indicators are used to assess these respective aspects. Temporary 
indicators serve to control the effects of disturbances induced by the economic situation and 
experienced by all firms (technological constraints, tighter debt financing conditions, etc.).  
Due to a lagged variable in our estimates, the corporate accounts needed to remain available 
for at least two consecutive years. Because of this, our sample comprises 2317 observations.  
As dynamic models are characterised by the presence of one or several lagged endogenous 
variables among the explanatory variables, a model estimate (1) using traditional methods 
(MCO and/or a fixed effect model) yields biased and non-converging estimators due to the 
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correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and the individual heterogeneity. 
Introducing a lagged variable raises the specific issue of simultaneity between this variable 
and the residual error term.  
To take all the possible partial sources of bias into consideration,19 we applied the 
econometric specification developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) which relies on the so-
called GMM system (Generalized Method of Moments), while estimates were obtained using 
Stata 10 software with the Xtabond2 command. This approach exploits independent variables 
along with their lagged differences. More specifically, the GMM system involves combining 
the system of equations at both first difference and levels for each period. It was specifically 
designed to provide estimates of data equations for a dynamic panel with persistent dependent 
variables and potentially endogenous independent variables. Blundell and Bond (1998) tested 
the method using Monte Carlo simulations and found that the GMM system estimator is more 
efficient than the GMM in first differences (Arellano & Bond, 1991) since the latter produces 
biased results for finite samples when the instruments are ‘weak’. 
Finally, two tests are associated with the dynamic panel GMM estimator. First, we have the 
Sargan/Hansen overidentification test, which is used to evaluate the validity of lagged 
variables as instruments. The second is Arellano and Bond’s (1991) autocorrelation test where 
the null hypothesis corresponds to the absence of second-order autocorrelation of errors.  
 
Results 
In Table 6, the lagged profitability coefficient value and its significance show the importance 
of taking the dynamics into account. Size has a positive and significant impact, confirming 
that larger companies are more profitable due to diminishing returns and market power.  
                                                 
19 Bias due to simultaneity, reserve causality (potentially endogenous independent variables), temporary 
correlation of errors and omitted variables, or certain measurement errors in explanatory variables 
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Table 6: Determinants of ROA (GMM system) 
 Equ. (1) 
Variable explained ROA 
Explanatory variables   
ROA (-1) (delayed by one period) 0.2382
*** 
(4.14) 
Size 0.0158
** 
(2.40) 
Growth in sales -0.0001
*** 
(-4.52) 
Debt -0.1519
*** 
(-3.52) 
Region 0.046 (1.59) 
Hub - 0.0476
** 
(-2.36) 
Hub* ROA(-1) -0.2206
* 
(-1.73) 
  
Observations 2317 
AR1 p = 0.000 
AR2 p = 0.821 
Test of Hansen  p = 0.556 
Student’s T distribution ratio between brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
Annual and sectorial indicators have been included in the model but are not recorded here. 
The estimates are calculated in two stages from GMM systems, with the Windmeijercorrection for standard errors. 
Number of instruments: 42. 
 
 
Conversely, the sales growth rate has a negative and significant impact on profitability. 
Companies experiencing high growth rates are slow to adapt their productive structure, 
thereby reducing their profitability. Debt financing also has a negative and significant impact 
because of the elevated cost of this type of financing compared to internal financing or equity 
financing. 
With regard to hub firm profitability, they do indeed appear to be less profitable than other 
companies as suggested by the significance of the hub indicator coefficient. Moreover, a 
redistributional effect can be confirmed at a 10% threshold. Hub firms are thus less profitable 
than other companies and their profitability is not persistent. If they are able to generate profit 
in the course of a year, it is likely to be captured by other companies in the value chain.  
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Analysis of sectorial contingences and limitations 
In the automotive industry, Dyer (1996) showed that the relational rent between constructers 
and suppliers enhances the partner’s financial performance (measured by Return On Assets 
(ROA)). In the same industry, Scannell, Vickery and Droge (2000), and Jayaram, Vickery and 
Droge (2008) identified a positive link between the intensity of constructer/supplier relations 
and value creation. Kotabe, Martin and Domoto (2003) and Corsten, Gruen and Peyinghaus 
(2011) showed that the development of trust, information exchange and specific investment 
enhanced performance. However, we identified evidence of the inverse situation in the 
aeronautics industry: despite all the conditions for the creation of relational rent being in 
place, we observed the formation of underperformance by hub firms. How can we explain this 
finding? We propose three explanations.  
First, it is possible that the architect-integrators capture all or part of the rent, thereby 
managing to extract the profit from the supply chain performance for themselves (Barringer & 
Harrison, 2000; Kogut, 2000; Min, et al., 2005). Fourcade and Midler (2004) and Naulleau 
and Guth (2000) argued that the first beneficiaries of vertical relation reconfigurations were 
the architect-integrators, since they transferred the risk to their strategic partners. In section 1, 
we showed that hub firms indeed assume increased risk (operational, security, demand and 
macro-economic risks). They must also face a huge increase in the investment required (cf. 
section 2) to ensure their position in the value chain, and, once in the intermediary position, 
they then have to assume the costs of storage.  
Secondly, factors contingent to the aeronautics industry may delay the appearance of this rent. 
While the length of the investment cycle is just a few years in the automotive industry (7 to 10 
years), it may span several dozen years in the aeronautics sector. Both of the Airbus 
programmes involving the emergence of hub firms, particularly the A380 and the A350 XWB 
programmes, were only at the beginning of their commercial life in 2007; the A350 was not 
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yet being developed, while the A380 made its maiden commercial flight that same year. Thus, 
it is still too early to calculate the positive impact of return on investment for these 
programmes. However, in return for sharing the risk, hub firms win contracts as the official 
supplier for a large number of planes (above break-even point), while capturing a bigger value 
ratio as they supply a component with higher value added. As long as the plane’s commercial 
success takes it beyond break-even point (around 400 planes for the A380, with 100 delivered 
in 2013), the ROI could be considerable (as with the A320 today). At the time we observed 
the hub firms’ performance, the break-even thresholds were still far from being attained and 
will not be for several years to come. The temporal gap is very wide between the initial 
investment and the first potential returns, at around twenty years for the A320. 
Third, the characteristics of hub firms themselves play a role. Their shareholder structure 
often remains family-based (especially in the case of medium-sized firms) and closed-ended. 
Hub firms often have specific legal forms, in particular that of ‘Société en Action Simple’, a 
form of partnership (over 65% of hub firms have this status: cf. Table 7). Large SMEs in 
particular, prefer this status rather than the more restrictive ‘Société Anonyme’, or limited 
company, especially when the owner-managers are majority shareholders in the firm’s capital. 
This is one of the main features of our hub firms which, while larger than the other players in 
our analysis sample, are nonetheless generally medium-sized companies with family-based 
capital. In effect, almost 70% of these firms are managed by sole owners or families.20 In 
more than 80% of cases, the majority shareholder holds over 50% of the capital (cf. Table 8). 
In other words, the latter hold a very high concentration of capital, which enables them to 
adopt other strategies than simply satisfying the interests of a floating shareholder structure 
(short-term financial performance). Finally, a hub firm’s strategy develops on the basis of 
family or historically-based capital that is well acquainted with the challenges in the sector. 
                                                 
20 To obtain this data, we used the Diane database, which provides the identity of all the shareholders in the firms 
in our sample.  
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Table 7: Legal form of 42 hub firms in 2007 
 
Legal forms  Number of firms (%) 
EURL (sole trader) 2.2 
Société en nom collectif (general partnership) 2.2 
SA à directoire et conseil de surveillance (Ltd. company with 
supervisory board) 4.3 
SARL (private limited liability company) 10.9 
SA (Ltd. company) 15.2 
SAS (simple partnership) 65.2 
Total 100 
Source: calculated by the authors from the greffe des tribunaux de commerce database (Diane). 
 
 
Table 8: Shareholder concentration for 42 hub firms in 2007 
 
Indicators Number of firms (%) 
Indicator A: any company where none of the listed shareholders 
(excluding collectively named shareholders) has a direct or 
indirect stake of over 25 % 
4.3 
Indicator B: any company where none of the listed shareholders 
(excluding collectively named shareholders as above) has a direct 
or indirect or "total calculated" stake of over 50%, but which has 
one or several shareholders with a direct or total participation of 
over 25% 
4.3 
Indicator C: any company that  has a listed shareholder (excluding 
collectively named shareholders) with a direct or indirect stake of 
over 50% 
2.2 
Indicator D: any company that  has a listed shareholder (excluding 
collectively named shareholders) with a direct stake of over 50% 82.6 
Indicator U: any company that does not fit into categories A, B, C 
or D, indicating a degree of ‘unknown’ independence 6.6 
Total 100 
Source: calculated by the authors from the greffe des tribunaux de commerce database (Diane). 
. 
 
Our study also has a number of limitations. The first limitation concerns the period of 
observation (2000-2007) which ideally should be extended to take into account an investment 
cycle duration of at least three decades. This gives rise to two difficulties. First, the conditions 
for the development of relational rent were only really in place around the end of the 1990s, 
which explains the choice of our observation period. Second, INSEE data for the Aquitaine 
and Midi-Pyrenees regions have only been available for the last twenty years. However, 
although we can conclude that hub firms are currently underperforming, we need to test the 
notion of the development of relational rent again in a future study.  
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The econometric analysis presented is also problematic. In effect, it highlights a 
redistributional effect as the hub firms’ profitability is not persistent. One possible 
explanation, which we only touched upon, would be that the annual profits made by the hub 
firms are later captured by other firms in the value chain, in particular by the upstream 
architect-integrators. A comparison of their financial performance over the long term could 
provide some answers to this question.  
The third limitation concerns the hub firms themselves. It would be useful to differentiate 
between medium-sized family-based firms and larger equipment manufacturing firms. Would 
we see a difference in performance between these two sub-categories of hub firms?  
 
Conclusion  
This paper demonstrates that in response to changes in the aeronautics sector, hub firms have 
taken on the role of architect-integrators of major components within the supply chain. We 
also showed that the conditions required for the development of relational rent between 
architect-integrators and hub firms exist within the aeronautics industry. According to the 
Relational-Based approach, this pivotal position should enable such firms to achieve an 
outperformance. The statistical analysis, performed between 2000 and 2007 with sub-
contracting firms in the local aeronautics sector in the Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrenees regions, 
enabled us to identify the impact of their status on the main organisational features of hub 
firms, such as the very high level of provisions and stock in view of the high level of risk-
taking and their intermediary position in the value chain. The econometric analysis confirmed 
that hub firms report a financial performance that is both less robust and less persistent than 
that of the other firms in our sample. To explain these results that contradict the hypothesis of 
the development of a relational rent in the aeronautics industry, we identified a number of 
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contingent factors: appropriation of the rent by the architect-integrators, the duration of the 
investment cycle and family-based capital all help to explain the underperformance of hub 
firms linked to this industry. In addition to these explanations, we also reached a theoretical 
conclusion: the arguments advanced by Dyer and Singh (1998) concerning the development 
of relational rent must be combined with conditions of validity if they are to be applied to the 
aeronautics sector. This again confirms the major impact that sector characteristics can have 
on the performance of a firm operating within it.  
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Appendix 1 Profitability and risk analysis: method  
 
The way the financial characteristics of hub firms impacts on their profitability and risk of 
bankruptcy was studied for the year 2007. The evolution of these impacts is set out for the 
years 2000 to 2007. More specifically, profitability and risk was analysed by a transverse 
observation of the evolution of ratios/variables between the years 2000 and 2007. The 
econometric analysis included a longitudinal analysis (cf. part 3 of the paper).  
Some traditional indicators from interim operating accounts, like gross operating surplus 
(profitability), current result (performance) and net result help us to address the issue of 
profitability, understood as the firm’s efficiency with respect to its business operations. We 
also included a set of ratios designed to reflect the efficiency/profitability of the use of 
resources. To this end, we compared elements from the profit and loss account with asset and 
liability items on the balance sheet (cf. Table 7, Appendix 2). In this way, we go beyond the 
economic performance measures generally taken into consideration of ROE (Return On 
Equity) and ROA (Return On Assets) (Dehning, Richardson & Zmud, 2007; Iwata & Okada, 
2011; Wagner, Grosse-Ruyken & Erhun, 2012). 
In a context of a bankruptcy risk analysis, whose aim is to evaluate the capacity of firms to 
meet their commitments, the choice of explanatory ratios is crucial (Dimitras, Zanakis & 
Zopounidis, 1996; Refait-Alexandre, 2004). In the present case, we used indicators adopted 
by the wealth management view of such a risk21 (Charreaux, 2000; Hoarau, 2008). This 
involves comparing the asset liquidity structure and the loan repayments structure in the 
long/medium term and in the short term (cf. Table 8, Appendix 2). We add an additional 
                                                 
21 This involves a static analysis method of risk of bankruptcy. Two other static analysis methods of financial 
structure are also well-known: the functional concept and the ‘pool of funds’ concept (Hoarau, 2008). Given the 
data at our disposal, it was difficult for us to use these other methods, even though they present certain 
advantages compared to the wealth management concept. 
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indicator (Mandru, et al., 2010): that of the Conan and Holder score (1979), which enables us 
to define a firm’s risk of defaulting.22 Figure 1 summarizes the approach used to measure 
financial performance.  
 
Figure 1: Financial performance indicators  
 
Source: the authors. 
 
                                                 
22 The Conan Holder credit score ranks businesses from the most risky (below 6.8) to the most robust (above 
16.4). Conan and Holder (1979) applied the following calculation: Z = 24R1 + 22R2 + 16R3 - 87R4 -15R5, with 
R1 = (gross outcome of exploitation/debts), R2 = (permanent capital/total assets), R3 = (inventory+current 
liabilities+current assets)/(total liabilities); R4 = (financial expenses/turnover) and R5 = (payroll/sales volume).  
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Appendix 2 Risk and profitability analysis: indicators 
 
Table 9: Indicators in operating profitability analysis  
 
Ratio Calculation methods/ Interpretation 
Analysis of a firm's 
performance with 
respect to its activity 
Economic rate of return (%) 
 
Equal to the ratio between (EBE / (net turnover + sub exploitation))*100. 
This ratio determines the manufacturing cost margin. It refers to the firm's 
performance with respect to its industrial and sales activity, independent of 
its financial/fiscal policy and its choice in terms of amortization. 
 
Performance (%) 
 
(Earnings before tax/ (net turnover + sub exploitation))*100.  Measures the 
firm's capacity to generate recurrent earnings from its sales, taking the 
choice of financing adopted into account. 
 
Net profitability 
 
(Profit/loss) / ((net turnover + sub exploitation))*100 
 
Analysis of 
implementation 
resource 
effectiveness 
 
Net return on equity (%) 
(Profit/net equity)*100. Measures the firm's efficient use of the resources 
provided by the shareholders. 
Net return on sustainable 
resources (%) 
 
((Earnings before tax + interest and assimilated costs) / (net sustainable 
resources)) * 100. This ratio provides an assessment of the return on 
sustainable resources invested in the firm. 
 
Productivity invested capital  
 
(Sales volume/(total assets + and collateral on borrowings)) 
 
Productivity of production 
potential  
(Sales volume /gross tangible and intangible assets). This ratio provides an 
appreciation of the success of investments, in other words, their capacity to 
generate profit. 
Source: based on Stolowy, Lebas and Langlois (2006). 
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Table10: Key indicators for bankruptcy risk analysis 
Ratio Interpretation 
General liquidity  
 
Equal to the ratio of liquid assets (available in under a year) that can be used for short-term liabilities. 
This measures whether the assets available in less than a year are sufficient to cover the liabilities 
due within the year. 
 
Reduced liquidity  
 
Equal to the ratio of liquid assets (less than a year) excluding stock that can be used for short-term 
liabilities, this measures the firm's liquidity, excluding stock. It thus refers to a firm's capacity to pay 
its short-term debts from its current assets. 
 
Financial autonomy  
 
Refers to the ratio between the firm's equity and balance sheet total. Measures the firm's self-
financing capacity compared to all other forms of financing. A ratio of around 20 to 25% is considered 
satisfactory (OSEO).  
 
Financial 
independence  
 
Refers to equity capital in sustainable resources, it measures the firm's capacity for self-financing 
(social capital, reserves). Financial organisations generally consider that the ratio should be above 
50% to be acceptable. 
 
Debt ratio (financial 
autonomy for 
Charreaux, 2000) 
 
Refers to the ratio between financial liabilities (long and medium-term)/own capital. Provides a 
measure of the long and medium-term debt burden on the firm's equity. This debt burden must be 
lower than the firm's equity. The (long-term) debt burden is considered by Hoarau (2008) as an 
indicator of financial independence. It provides an assessment of a firm's capacity to resist economic 
downturns and the degree of dependence on lenders. 
 
Total debt (D) 
 
(Debts + unearned revenue)/net turnover) * 360. Provides an assessment of the number of days of 
turnover required to cover the firm's debt obligations. It is particularly useful from a dynamic and 
comparative point of view. 
 
Solvency ratio  
 
Used to measure a firm's capacity to meet its short and long-term liabilities. This ratio indicates the 
likelihood of a firm to default on its debt obligations. 
 
Working capital 
turnover cover (D) 
 
Equal to the ratio of overall net working capital to net turnover* 360. Working capital represents a 
financial margin that provides cover against asset and debt risk asymmetry. In effect, while it is 
certain that debts must be repaid in the short term, asset liquidity is not at all certain. In this context, 
creditors prefer it to be positive as it guarantees the short-term repayment of loans banks may grant 
in the event of loss of current assets. 
 
Requirements in 
working capital turnover 
cover (D) 
 
Equal to the ratio between working capital requirements and net turnover * 360. Working capital 
requirements represents the need for finance linked to the operating cycle. It is obtained by adding 
together the inventory accounts (raw materials, merchandise, products and work in progress, finished 
products) and receivables (client receivables, advances paid to suppliers and other creditors) less 
the operating liabilities (accounts payable, social and tax liabilities, advances received from clients 
and other accounts receivable). 
 
Financial Interest rate 
 
Equal to the ratio between the financial interests* 100 and turnover. Provides a measure of the 
percentage of financial charges in the firm's total level of activity. Growth In this rate may correspond 
to an increase in debt often induced by recurrent cash flow problems. 
 
Self-financing capacity 
(SFC)  
 
Equal to the ratio between SFC before distribution and net turnover + operating subsidy In 
percentage. 
 
Capacity to repay 
 
Equal to the ratio of financial debts/ SFC before distribution. The debt repayment annuity/self-
financing capacity ratio measures the burden of annual debt due dates on the firm's internal 
resources. A ratio above 50% generally indicates an excess of debt compared to the firm's self-
financing capacity, insofar as the latter must divert too much of its SFC to repaying its loans. 
Source: based on Stolowy, Lebas and Langlois (2006). 
 
The terminology for the ratios presented is from the Diane database. Some of the methods 
used for computing the ratios presented in our paper may differ. For instance, according to 
Charreaux (2000), the financial autonomy ratio is understood as the ratio between financial 
debts payable at over one year and the firm’s equity. This definition corresponds to our debt 
ratio data. 
